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Pakistan has been facing a complex security situation along its Western borders for nearly a 
decade now. The volatile situation along the border with Afghanistan coupled with indigenous 
problems in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Provincially Administered 
Tribal Areas (PATA) in KP, have left the whole frontier region vulnerable to terrorist attacks as 
well as protracted armed conflict.  During this time there has been a wave of Talibanization in 
FATA and PATA in KP, which has often ended up in military operations to flush out the 
miscreants. Over time, the attacks and operations have increased in frequency while the local 
Taliban (TTP) continue to wrest control of pockets of land in FATA and PATA in KP from where 
they continue to run their operation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Over the last few years this wave of Talibanization has crossed over from the traditional border 
areas in to the more settled1 areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa such as Swat, Buner and Malakand. 
This trend reached its climax in 2009 when the Taliban inspired and allied, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-
Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) took over the Swat Valley and banished all Government 
functionaries operating there. This led to a large scale military operation, Operation Rah-e-
Raast, which flushed out the militants and liberated the Swat Valley. In the aftermath of this 
operation, the discussion on how the TNSM managed to take over Swat Valley and what factors 
led to this occupation, took center stage. This discussion was dominated by the view that the 
growing trend of Talibanization coupled with religious extremism and overflow of the Afghan 
War2 was to blame for the Swat Occupation and that the weak early response by the Provincial 
Government helped prolong the conflict. But both these points focus on how the conflict 
happened and what contributed to it but they fail to address the core question, what factor/s 
led to historically peaceful Swat/Malakand to enter an armed conflict in the first place and 
what it would take to ensure a lasting peace in the region post conflict. 
Throughout this paper I will attempt to challenge this notion that the Swat Conflict resulted 
from rising Talibanization and as an overflow of the Afghan War by presenting an alternative 
narrative based on the hypothesis that Prolonged periods of bad governance are the main 
cause for the armed conflict in Swat/Malakand as they led to; 
• Power Vacuum as a direct result of the Political Status Ambiguity  
• Lack of Development 
• Appeasement Strategy 
                                                          
1 The “settled” areas is the name commonly given to those parts of the frontier in which the state has 
implemented regular forms of governance  and taxation, viz., the districts which fall under the authority of the 
North-West Frontier Province and which are not considered to be tribal areas. 
2 White, Joshua T.  (2008). The Shape of Frontier Rule: Governance and Transition, from the Raj to the Modern 
Pakistani Frontier. Asian Security Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3. 
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In the argument that follows, I will attempt to provide historical and analytical grounding to this 
hypothesis by providing historical background to the Swat Conflict as well as presenting the 
findings of an extensive field research conducted in the Swat Valley and Peshawar.  
To start with it is crucial to define the type of conflict that took place in Swat and is the 
dominant type across the border regions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with the definition of 
what Talibanization is for the purposes of this paper. Next it is pertinent to analyze the history 
of Swat and the background to TNSM to explain how things came about. Lastly, field research 
conducted in the Swat Valley as well as in Peshawar will be presented to substantiate the 
hypothesis using findings based on the primary data collected.   
Defining ‘Conflict’ 
Conflict can be defined as a ‘contested incompatibility’ which concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths3. So, for the purposes of this 
study conflict is a case where the state is at war with another party that lays claim to the writ of 
the state within a particular area or a territory4. This can mean that a conflict can arise between 
two countries as well as rebel groups within a state. Either way an armed conflict would involve 
one party challenging other party’s writ within a specific geographic location.  
                                                          
3 Wallensteen, Peter &  S o l l e n b e r g , Margareta.  (2001)  Armed Confl ic t , 1989-2000. Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 38, No. 5. 
4 The separate elements of the definition are operationalised as follows:  
(1) Use of armed force: use of arms in order to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict, resulting in deaths. Arms: 
any material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks, stones, fire, water, etc. 
(2) 25 deaths: a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility. 
(3) Party: a government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of opposition organizations. 
(3.1) Government: the party controlling the capital of the state. 
(3.2) Opposition organization: any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and 
using armed force. 
(4) State: a state is 
(4.1) an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or 
(4.2) an internationally unrecognised government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by 
another internationally recognised sovereign government previously controlling the same territory. 
(5) Incompatibility concerning government and/or territory the incompatibility, as stated by the parties, must concern government 
and/or territory.  
(5.1) Incompatibility: the stated generally incompatible positions.  
(5.2) Incompatibility concerning government: incompatibility concerning type of political system, the replacement of 
the central government or the change of its composition. 
(5.3) Incompatibility concerning territory: incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the 
state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (intrastate conflict). 
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For the purposes of this study the conflict that is under discussion is that of non-international 
nature i.e. domestic armed conflict or an insurgency5. According to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), non-international armed conflict exists when there is:  
“Protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.” 
Thus, in the view of the ICTY, for there to be a non-international armed conflict: 
• Non-state armed groups must carry out protracted hostilities; and 
• These groups must be organized. 
In the context of this paper, both these conditions were met by the TNSM who were an 
organized group with an armed militia at their disposal. In addition to that the TNSM were 
allied to the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), an organization that has publicly stated its intention to 
engage the State of Pakistan in an armed conflict. In the post conflict situation, the Government 
did establish its writ again within the area and TNSM along with TTP were defeated completely.  
Phenomenon of ‘Talibanization’ 
The term Talibanization refers to the rise and spread of the Taliban along the Pak-Afghan 
Border6. It can be understood as a phenomenon where by Taliban values of strict Salafi Islam 
are backed with armed enforcement in various regions.  Talibanization itself is not a threat from 
one or two groups, but it is more of an ideology taken up by various distinct and locally-
oriented groups to pursue their own goals7. Hence, Talibanization is not just limited to groups 
that are strictly allied with the Afghan Taliban or the Pakistani Taliban; instead it is more of a 
brand used by groups taking up arms to achieve their own distinct goals in various regions.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, the activities of TNSM in the Swat/Malakand region are referred 
to as Talibanization of that area. TNSM was the largest group in the region that was 
spearheading this effort but they were not alone, a number of non-Swati groups like Waziristan 
Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and East Turkestan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM) formed the bulk of foreign fighters in the region8. The foreign fighters 
joined the TNSM once they had already taken over much of the Swat Valley and had launched 
attacks in nearby areas.  
                                                          
5 According to the US State Department an insurgency is an attempt by any anti-state group to seize, nullify, or 
challenge political control over a particular region. Hence, an armed insurgency would be doing so in a scenario 
where the anti-state group is heavily armed.  
6 Wang, Lien (2010) Talibanization in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in 
Asia) Vol. 4, No. 1. Shanghai International Studies University.  
7 White, Joshua T. (2009) Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan’s Frontier. Counter Insurgency and 
Pakistan Paper Series, No. 2. The Brookings Institute, Washington DC.  
8 Suleiman, Sadia and Bokhari, Adnan A.S. (2009) The Swat Conflict: An Arc of Instability Spreading from 
Afghanistan to Central Asia and Xinjiang. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 13. The Jamestown Foundation.  
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Swat: A brief history 
The Malakand Division is 
comprised of seven 
districts of Malakand, 
Swat, Bunir, Shangla, 
Upper Dir, Lower Dir, and 
Chitral. The total area of 
the Division is around 
29,871 sq km, which 
equals to about 40 
percent of the total area 
of the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) 
and 3.7 percent of 
Pakistan’s total land 
area. The two main cities 
in Swat are Mingora and 
Saidu Sharif. Both cities 
are about 5 miles away 
from each other. Saidu 
Sharif is the seat of 
power as it has 
traditionally housed all 
government 
functionaries as well as 
the courts while Mingora is the main business hub for the whole region. The   area  has  a  high   
strategic   significance   by connecting  Pakistan  with  its most reliable  partner,  the Peoples’ 
Republic  of China  on  north-east,  and  Afghanistan   on  north-west  by s eparating Pakistan 
from Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan through a narrow strip of 20 km at Wakhan.  
 
Principality of Swat 
 
Swat State has the distinction of not being imposed by an imperial power or an individual but 
was founded in 1915 by a jirga of the Swat Valley after doing away with the rule of the Nawab 
of Dir over their areas. The principality was dependent upon British Indian Government and 
later Pakistan for currency, post, foreign affairs and electricity. Swat State or Wali Swat as it was 
commonly known as was internally independent. It had its own laws, its own justice, army, 
police and administration, budget and taxes, and even its own flag9. 
  
                                                          
9 Rome, Sultan-e- (2006) Administrative System of the Princely State of Swat. Journal of the Research Society of 
Pakistan 
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Since its formation, Swat was a peaceful place where the Wali ruled without any resistance. 
This was primarily due to the fact that the state of Swat was formed based on a consensus of 
the Jirga. This allowed the Wali to spend time focusing on developing the state economically 
and socially. Priority was given to roads, schools and hospitals. Free education and health 
services were provided to all citizens. In effect it was welfare state under the patronage of the 
British Raj. Even after the independence of Pakistan, Swat continued to function as an 
independent state till 196910.  
 
Just after the partition in 1949, the Wali Abdul Wadud who had led Swat State since 1917 
abdicated the throne in favor of his son Miangul Jahanzeb. The new Wali launched a host 
developmental works and schemes to consolidate his rule by gaining popularity among the 
masses. This continued for a few years and then the Wali starting facing internal challenges to 
his authority in the form of tribal elders such as the Khans and Khattaks. While there were 
people who supported the Wali and the independent state, a growing number of intellectuals 
and Businessmen started pushing for democratic reforms even though the State of Swat 
enjoyed a flourishing economy and political stability. The talk of reform was in most cases 
driven by those who wished to have a political say in Swat but were unable to do so due to the 
popularity and strong control of the Wali. But various stakeholders kept building pressure on 
the Wali to reform. The Wali managed to delay any serious discussion on democratic reforms 
partly due to the fact he was the Son-in-Law of General Ayub, the President of Pakistan during 
that time. This helped the Wali exercise power without any serious repercussions as the State 
of Pakistan kept out Swat’s business. But once General Ayub left power, General Yahya 
announced the merger of the State of Swat, Dir and Chitral with Pakistan. They were to fall 
under the Malakand Division which was to be under the Provincial Government in Peshawar. It 
is said that General Yahya was reluctant to have this merger but his hand was forced by his 
Chief of Staff, General Pirzada11.   
 
After the Merger 
 
Upon merger with Pakistan, Swat was embedded into the governance structure of the 
provincial government. Although it was part of North West Frontier Province, it was 
administratively under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The political agent of 
Malakand division was the overseeing authority helped by the District Commissioner of Swat. 
The flow chart below shows the administrative structure that Swat currently exists under.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Rome, Sultan-e- (1999) Merger of Swat State with Pakistan Causes and Effects. MARC Occasional Papers, No. 14. 
The University of Geneva 
11 Ibid 
Government of North West Frontier Province/ Khyber 
 
Division of Malakand 
Political Agent 
District of Swat 
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Ever since the merger, the above mentioned structure has been in place. Swat has kept its 
historical role of being the gateway to the Northern Areas such as Chitral and Gilgit as well as 
being a major stop on the way to Bajaur and Afghanistan. But the merger created serious issues 
as well; the merger itself resulted in confusion and chaos in Swat. As nearly the Wali Swat’s 
entire infrastructure was deemed void, this meant that the people had no one to turn to with 
their pleas and litigation issues. As the merger meant that the Law of Pakistan would be 
enforced, the days of quick judicial processes ended.  The litigants did not know where to turn 
for justice. Quick trials and decisions, whether just or unjust, and their proper execution as well 
as implementation came to an end. The prolonged procedures, undue delay, great 
expenditures, high bribes, and the further deterioration by PATA Regulations made the 
situation worse. But no attention was paid to these changing situations in Swat and overall in 
the PATA areas. Over the years the situation continued exactly like this, whereas at one time 
the people of Swat were a fully independent and thriving principality functioning as a welfare 
state, they had ended up becoming a district ruled by those sitting in Peshawar. This fostered 
resentment in the local population who to this day talk about the time of Wali Swat as that was 
the most prosperous time for the area.  
 
Roots of Disgruntlement 
 
Contrary to popular belief the trouble in Swat did not start in the 2000s or as a result of the 
Afghan War and the Talibanization that followed it. In fact the very first signs of trouble in Swat 
became visible all the way back in 1992. Tired of government neglect in providing swift and free 
justice and other social services, a religious teacher by the name of Sufi Mohammad formed a 
movement called Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM - Movement for the 
Enforcement of Islamic Sharia). Formerly part of the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Sufi Mohammad 
broke ranks to form his movement centered around a localized issue and with a single point 
agenda. The point of the movement was to impose Sharia Law in Swat and its adjoining areas. 
At this point it is crucial to understand why the demand was as simple as imposition of Sharia 
Law and not something as complicated as a power sharing agreement.  
 
Since the end of the State of Swat, judicial processes were going haywire; people in their search 
for quick justice were relying on Jirgas, Qazis and Political Agents. As there was no state of Swat 
anymore, all the rules and regulations of that era had been declared null and void. In absence 
of that and facing lack of access to legal and social services, Sharia law seemed like the best 
possible alternative. Firstly, it was law that could not be challenged in its legitimacy given nearly 
100% of Swat is Muslim and secondly the structure needed for implementation of Sharia was 
already there in the form of Swat Levies Force. So effectively, Sharia Law was the best possible 
alternative solution to the problems of judicial access and social services plaguing Swat in a post 
merger scenario. 
Initially, TNSM under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad demanded that the NWFP (now Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa) Government allow the imposition of Sharia in Swat/ Malakand as it was the 
demand of the people. After being ignored for a couple of years, the TNSM came to 
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prominence through an armed uprising in 1994. The resulting uprising left about 40 people 
dead including security personnel and the Frontier Constabulary was called in to quell the 
uprising12. Once the peace was achieved, the Government of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 
entered in to negotiations with Sufi Mohammad and eventually on the 2st of December 2004, 
the Nizam-e-Shariat Ordinance was issues that ensured that Sharia rule would come in to force 
in the region of Malakand13. Under this framework, the judicial system was 'Islamised', where 
by Judges were to be referred to as Qazi and the courts were supposed to follow the Sharia law 
to the letter. This system was supposed to run parallel to the normal judicial system and people 
were given a choice between the two when bringing cases to the court. The Nizam-e-Shariat 
Regulation was enforced in Swat and the rest of Malakand division and Kohistan in 1994 and 
then, with some amendments, in 1999. But this did not have much of an impact on how things 
were carried out. In fact the system worked more or less in the same manner as before the 
implementation of the Nizam-e-Shariat regulation (IPCS, 2009). This gave the TNSM enough 
time to establish them as a force in the Malakand region14.   
 
Rise of TNSM  
After establishing themselves as a force in the Malakand Division, TNSM started consolidating 
its gains by expanding its Madrassah network across the region focusing on the Agency of 
Bajaur that borders Afghanistan. After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, TNSM is reported 
to have sent thousands of fighters to fight alongside the Taliban. The fighting force mostly 
made of teenagers and students from the Madrassahs run by the TNSM was beaten as a result 
of Allied bombing in the early phases of the conflict. Incurring heavy losses, Sufi Mohammad 
returned to the Malakand Division with his remaining fighters. The government of Pakistan 
arrested him on his own request as he feared backlash from within over his decision to lead a 
bunch of teenagers in to conflict with one of the most well trained armies. At this point the 
running of TNSM was handed over to his Son in Law, Maulvi Fazlullah, who was at that time a 
chair lift operator near Mingora.  
Upon taking the helm of the TNSM, Fazlullah changed the way TNSM was operating in the 
region by utilizing new technologies. The most unique of his new tactics was the use of a pirate 
radio station that also earned him the nickname of "Maulana Radio". He used the radio 
broadcasts to spread his message of Sharia and its enforcement across the whole Malakand 
region making populist statements and talking about social issues often quoting the time of the 
Wali Swat as an example. The crux of his broadcasts was how things had gotten bad ever since 
the merger and the only way to make them better was to bring about full Sharia law. His 
frequent radio broadcasts earned him quite a following over the years. To add to his popularity, 
the Government’s inept response to the Earthquake of 2005 in the region helped boost his 
                                                          
12 TNSM Profile by SATP. Available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/TNSM.htm 
13 TNSM Profile by Global Security.org. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/tnsm.htm 
14 TNSM Profile by SATP. Available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/TNSM.htm 
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popularity and calls for imposition of Sharia in Swat. This was the time when the TNSM took up 
the role of a social organization providing people with relief through its decade old established 
network across Malakand. This helped TNSM gain legitimacy in the eyes of the local population 
who saw the organization as a beacon of hope in their time of need.  
By 2007 Fazlullah had started skirmishes with the Pakistani Army across the Malakand division. 
This was after his forces had over run police stations and paramilitary outposts in the Swat and 
Saidu Sharif. It was at this point that the Pakistani Army sent in reinforcements to take back the 
settled regions of Swat from Fazlullah. More than 200 policemen and soldiers were killed during 
fighting in Swat in 2007. And Fazlullah maintained the control of parts of Mingora while 
vacating Saidu Sharif. By 2008, after the fresh elections, the new Awami National Party (ANP), a 
Pakhtun nationalist party had formed the government in NWFP and started negotiating with 
the TNSM. In mid 2008, the government signed first of many peace deals with the TNSM that 
ensured that the government offices were to continue functioning in Swat and a tougher model 
of Sharia as presented by the TNSM was to be enforced.  
The upgraded ordinance was called the Nizam-e-Adl ordinance which was a modification of the 
1999 version which itself was based on the original ordinance passed in 1994. The law was 
eventually ratified by the National Assembly and the President in 2009 with the hopes that it 
would bring about long term peace in the region of Malakand. But that failed to happen as 
emboldened by the government apparent strategy of appeasement, Maulana Fazlullah ordered 
the TNSM and it’s Taliban Allies who were mostly foreign fighters operating in Afghanistan, to 
enter Buner, a neighboring district to Swat. The move was aimed at creating a stronghold for 
TNSM and its Taliban allies from where they could operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan without 
any major checks. The geographical location of Swat/. Malakand was crucial to the Taliban allies 
as it provided them a better base of operations as compared to Waziristan as Swat was 
centrally located. This incursion was a violation of the peace accord signed alongside Nizam-e-
Adl. And after a number of failed negotiations to convince TNSM to move back in to their 
already established region of Swat, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government finally requested that 
Pakistan Army be sent in to clear out the area and reestablish the writ of the government.  
On May 7th 2009, over 700,000 residents of Mingora and Saidu Sharif evacuated their cities on 
the orders of the government in preparation of the Military Operation. These residents were 
part of about 2.2 million people who became displaced due to the conflict. Most of these 
people were housed in Internally Displaced Camps established in Mardan, Peshawar and 
Charsaddha15.    
 
 
 
                                                          
15 ACTED (2009) Rapid Need Assessment for Swat District. ACTED PAKISTAN  
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The Conflict  
After the mass evacuation of the Swat District, the Army launched the Operation Rahe-Rast in 
early May 2009 to flush out the TNSM from Swat and adjoining areas. The operation started 
with aerial bombardment of TNSM targets around Mingora. Next came the ground offensive 
where the Pakistan Army entered Malakand Division through Mardan. By 30 June 2009, it was 
reported that the security forces had claimed Swat Valley, Malakand, Mingora, and Charbagh 
by killing about 1500 TNSM fighters while arresting about 250 others. Large caches of weapons 
were recovered from TNSM operation bases across the region. 
 
In a relatively short period of time, the Army was able to reestablish the Government’s control 
within the region and finally in second half of 2009, the government started inviting the 
Internally Displaces persons to come back in to the region. Having left the area to for security 
reasons, people came back to find their livelihoods destroyed, their infrastructure completely in 
shambles and all basic utilities and services wiped out as part the army action. It is important to 
keep in mind that most of the damage that was done to the region was by the TNSM and their 
allies who while retreating blew up bridges, grid stations, schools, government buildings and so 
on16. 
 
While the operation was seen as necessary to root out the TNSM, it had a heavy cost in terms 
of the loss of jobs and complete destruction of the local economy and infrastructure. The 
fighting itself caused loss of lives, injuries, and damages to private and public property. Houses, 
standing crops, livestock, schools, health facilities, water supply/irrigation schemes, public 
office buildings, roads, electricity/gas networks, shops, hotels, businesses, all suffered damages 
to varying degrees17. So while Swat was facing various economic and development hurdles due 
to its ambiguous status even before the conflict, the conflict just compounded the problems as 
now the most basic of infrastructures that had survived since the time of Wali Swat were no 
longer there.  
 
Post Conflict 
 
Once the conflict was over, the Government of Pakistan engaged the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank to conduct a Damage Need Assessment (DNA) Study in the region to get an 
initial understanding of what had to be done. The broad scope of work of the DNA included:  
• Quantification and validation of physical damages caused  
• Development of sector level strategies for the immediate restoration of (public and 
private) infrastructure, services, and livelihoods 
                                                          
16 Interview with Brigade Commander Swat/Shangla conducted on 27th of August 2011 at Circuit House, Saidu 
Sharif, Swat.  
17Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) (2009) Post Crisis Need 
Assessment Report. PDMA/PaRRSA Publications, Peshawar.  
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• Quantification of corresponding needs in respect of the immediate reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of critical damaged infrastructure and services and the restoration of 
livelihood opportunities.  
 
The DNA was taken as the baseline on which all projects were to be planned. In order to further 
simplify the aid work, the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) in association with 
International Aid Agencies such as USAID and UNDP set up Provincial Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction Authority (PaRRSA). PaRRSA was to serve as the main mechanism for the 
implementation of all rehabilitation and reconstruction work to be undertaken within the Swat 
region. PaRRSA’s main purpose to funnel funds provided by international donor agencies as it 
was seen as an institutions that had a very strong oversight structure averting fears of 
International Donors about corruption during the relief work. In addition to that, the 
Government of Pakistan does not recognize ‘War’ as a ‘Disaster’ so when a situation like Swat 
happened, they had to use a different strategy and tackle the situation as a stand-alone case. 
As the existing government structures had been totally destroyed as a result of the conflict, a 
different strategy had to be developed where by the Government Departments were to be set 
up again. But even at this time, the Government of KP and the Federal Government did not 
change the status of Swat. In fact due to its status as part of the Malakand Division, most of the 
post conflict aid work had to be done through the Provincial Government which clearly lacked 
the capacity to take on such a large task. So when PaRRSA was created to function as the 
overseeing authority it was not aimed at fixing the core problem of lack of institutions.  
 
To its credit PaRRSA came up with the Malakand Strategy18 that was specifically targeted at 
solving the issues of Swat in a Post Conflict Situation. To start with the biggest issue was the 
repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to Swat and then 
the rebuilding of infrastructure lost during the conflict19. The onus on building all physical 
infrastructures lost as the key priority, while social and economic programs took the back seat. 
Hence, even after the military action and the liberation of Swat, the issue of swift judicial 
system and social justice failed to make it as a part of the strategy in the short run. Also ignored 
were lessons from the previous civilian administrations in Swat/ Malakand and the failure of 
the Political Agents to exercise their powers in presence of Local Government Officials. The fact 
that Malakand had been running parallel governance systems where there was a local 
government running alongside a powerful commissioner operating under a Political Agent who 
was responsible to the Provincial Government, was ignored as a possible improvement area 
instead post conflict work just focused on rebuilding the physical infrastructure.  
 
                                                          
18 Malakand Strategy was written before the creation of the Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) was created. The 
strategy was envisioned as a living document with changes being made on regular intervals till the completion of the 
PCNA. Both documents were created by PaRRSA in association with its partners such as the World Bank, The ADB 
and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
http://www.pdma.gov.pk/PaRRSA/Publications_and_Downloads.php 
 
19 Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) (2009). The Malakand Strategy. 
PaRRSA/PDMA Publications. Peshawar.  
Final Thesis  Adnan Rasool  
12 
 
Based on the historical background of the region it can be deduced that it was not the 
talibanization that cause the conflict eventually, but in fact it was the mismanagement of Swat 
after the merger by government that was the key. TNSM started out as an organization 
demanding quicker justice through the Sharia law just like Swat had in the days of Wali Swat. In 
addition to that the lack of development works in Swat and the Government’s inept response 
during crisis period like the floods and the earthquakes further frustrated the local people who 
sided with the TNSM as it was seen as an opposition to the government. At no point in any 
literature or interview related to TNSM and its leaders does it mention any other reason for its 
formation. So potentially, if the Government had invested time in clearing up the political 
status of Swat and more importantly establishing state institutions there, the chances of TNSM 
and other such organizations coming about would have been drastically reduced if not ended. 
The appeasement strategy as evidenced from historical facts just emboldened the TNSM and its 
allies to further stake their claims on other regions. Hence, even after the conflict the core 
reasons for it still exists.  
 
Field Study  
 
In order to provide data evidence to the hypothesis in a post conflict Swat, a field study was 
conducted as part of this study. The focus of the field study was to gauge public perception as 
to what led to the conflict and what since the end of the conflict has been done to ensure that 
genuine improvement comes to the region of Swat/ Malakand. Given that the subject is fairly 
complicated and complex, usual survey techniques such as a paper based survey were unviable. 
Instead interviews were carried out in casual one on one conversation as well group 
discussions. Limited by time and financial constraints a total of 30 people were interviewed 
with each interview lasting about 45 minutes. Each interview was conducted based on a set of 
questions that were designed to provide answers to the research questions mentioned earlier.  
Out of the 30 people that were interviewed, 15 of them were from the urban parts of Swat i.e. 
Mingora and Saidu Sharif, while the rest were from villages in the 5 Kilometer radius of Mingora 
and Saidu Sharif. As mentioned earlier due to time and financial constraints, it was not possible 
to get a larger sample size or increase the coverage area of the survey.  
In addition to conducting a perception survey, key personnel interviews were also conducted 
within the region as well as Peshawar, the seat of the provincial government. Key personnel 
interviews of the following officials were conducted as they are the key decision makers in their 
field of work: 
 Provincial Government (Bureaucracy) 
 Military (Commanding Officer Swat) 
 Civil Society (Newspaper Editors, Human Rights Advocates, Local Organizations and 
Village Organizations) 
 Village Elders and Tribal Elders 
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 Provincial Disaster Management Authority 
 Civilian Authorities in Swat 
 Police and Law Enforcement Agencies in Swat 
In total about 10 key personnel interviews were conducted of the above mentioned 
stakeholders. The questions put forward to the respondents were aimed at gathering a 
perception as to what had happened in there. Some of the questions asked were on following 
lines: 
 
 Why did the conflict happen? 
 What is public perception of various institutions? 
 How have things changed since the time of Wali Swat? 
 What are the priorities of the public?  
 What is expected from the Government? 
 Do people understand the status of Swat? 
 How is the public service rated? 
 Has democracy made a difference?  
 Why were the TNSM supported initially?  
 What was the main reason TNSM gained public support? 
 Who do you think runs Swat?  
 Have things improved since the end of the conflict? 
 What changes do you wish to see now that the conflict is over? 
 
The survey findings are tabulated on a question by question basis. A total of 25 questions were 
asked to each respondent. Out of the 25 questions, 20 of them were multiple choice questions 
while 5 were open ended questions. The open ended questions are tabulated using the key 
words that were common across all answer choices. The 30 respondents who were questioned 
belonged to various walks of life including farmers, shop owners, taxi driver, waiters, small 
business owners, students, teachers, truck drivers and so on. The 10 personnel interviews that 
were conducted with key decision makers also included the standardized survey and their 
answers are tabulated as well. It should be noted here that all respondents were not paid for 
answering questions on the survey and that they did so voluntarily.  
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Q1. What is your opinion of the Government? 
 
When the respondents were asked what is their 
general opinion of the government (Provincial, 
Local and National) was, majority responded by 
saying very low. About one third of the 
respondents have an average opinion of the 
government while no one surveyed had a high or 
very high opinion of the government.  
 
 
 
Q2. What is your opinion of the TNSM/Taliban? 
 
When asked what their opinion of TNSM and 
Taliban was, nearly all respondents replied by 
saying low or very low. A handful of respondents 
had an average opinion of the TNSM. When asked 
why did they have an average opinion of the 
TNSM, the respondents replied by saying they liked 
the message of the TNSM. 
 
 
 
Q3. Do you think the Swat Conflict could have 
been avoided? 
 
An overwhelming majority of the respondents 
believe that the Swat Conflict could have been 
avoided from the very start. About 17% of the 
respondents believed that no matter what was 
done, the conflict was inevitable. The Majority 
believed that if the right steps had been taken 
early on, there would have been no need of the 
conflict.  
 
Q4. Are you satisfied with the way the conflict 
was handled? 
 
Majority of the people surveyed were happy with 
the way the conflict was handled. They believed 
that the army did what it had to do and nothing 
more could have been done. A handful of people 
thought that conflict was mishandled and that the 
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damage incurred was much greater than what could have been. They also believed that 
damage was much higher as both sides disregarded the public property and infrastructure 
during the conflict.  
 
Q5. Do you think the current judicial and social 
services structure is satisfactory? 
The question was asked to gauge the public 
perception with regards to the judicial and social 
service delivery in Swat/Malakand. Majority of the 
people were unhappy with the Justice and Social 
Service delivery while minority of about 25% was 
satisfied with the way things were. It should be 
noted that all the respondents satisfied with the 
current judicial and social service delivery were 
residents of the urban areas, while those who responded with NO were from both urban and 
rural areas.  
 
Q6. Do you understand the Political Structure in 
Swat? 
When asked if the respondents understood the 
political structure in Swat i.e. the decision making 
process and structure of the civilian authorities, 
90% of the people replied that they were unaware 
of the decision making process and the structure of 
civilian authorities. They complained that there 
were too many officials doing more or less the same 
things and that people were unable to understand what department would be able to help 
them. Only about 10% of all respondents were aware of the political structure in the region. It 
should be noted that everyone who was satisfied with the political structure was resident of 
urban areas.  
 
 
Q7. How important is Governance to you? 
When the respondents were asked how important 
governance was to them, every one replied with 
either important or Very Important. Most of the 
respondents also clarified that governance to them 
meant smoother civil administration, low corruption 
and better public service.    
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Q8. How would you rate the government's 
performance before the conflict? 
 
As expected, nearly all respondents thought the 
government’s performance before the conflict was 
low or very low. The respondents also mentioned that 
they were given no importance before the conflict 
and had been ignored for a long time by the 
provincial government. They also raised the point 
that the government had sold out the people of Swat 
to TNSM multiple times even before the conflict 
began.  
 
Q9. How would you rate the government's 
performance after the conflict? 
After the conflict about 30% of the people had a high 
opinion of the Government’s performance, while 
majority of the people still had a low or an average 
opinion. The respondents clarified that this was due 
to the fact that the government had only cleared the 
area from terrorists but had not provided adequate 
relief to the people. A number of people complained 
that even after the conflict, the government has started to ignore the concerns of the people 
again while maintaining a heavy military presence in the city.  
 
Q10. Have things improved since the time of Wali 
Swat? 
Majority of the people surveyed believed that things 
had not improved since the time of Wali Swat. The 
respondents thought the basic needs of life were 
being met but the society was better off under Wali 
Swat as compared to now. Only a handful people 
thought that the situation had improved since the 
time of Wali Swat.  
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Q11. Do you think if the rules and regulations of Wali Swat had continued Swat would be 
better off? 
Every respondent interviewed believed that if the 
rules and regulations of Wali Swat had continued the 
region would be better off now. Everyone agreed that 
the rules and regulations from that time were 
universally accepted across the whole region and no 
one had any opposition towards them. Rules such as 
deciding village level cases through the Village Qazi 
were aimed at saving people time and money. Such 
simple laws if continued would have made things 
easier for people. In addition to that, introduction of 
new rules and regulations after the merger confused a lot of people who were not used to the 
court system and the commissioner system.  
 
 
Q12. Do you think conflict will return to the Swat 
Valley? 
About 30% of respondents firmly believed that conflict 
would eventually return to the Swat valley as the core 
reasons for it still existed. Nearly half of all 
respondents were not sure if it would return while 
only about 10% of the respondents were positive that 
the conflict would not return to the Swat valley 
anytime in the future.  When inquired why people 
though conflict might return, the overwhelming answer was that there are no strong 
institutions while the TNSM introduced institutions that actually worked and were not corrupt. 
It was also stated that’s sooner or later, the TNSM would regroup and when the Army leaves 
Swat, it would come back in again from its current basis in Afghanistan, so long term peace in 
Swat was a question mark.  
 
 
Q13. In your opinion were the demands of TNSM 
valid? 
Surprisingly majority of the people interviewed 
thought that the demands put forward by the TNSM 
were genuine and that they supported them. About 
1/3rd of respondents believed otherwise. They thought 
that the TNSM demand for imposition of Sharia would 
have further sidelined Swat within Pakistan. They also 
feared that TNSM demands would have let to similar 
Final Thesis  Adnan Rasool  
18 
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
Yes No  
Do you prefer Sharia Law over the 
traditional Law? 
0 5 10 15 20 
Commissioner 
Brigade Commander 
Chief Minister 
Political Agent  
Nazim 
Who do you think runs Swat? 
90% 
10% 
Did the government's strategy of 
appeasement make the TNSM 
stronger? 
Yes 
No 
movements starting up in other areas of Pakistan. But majority of the people firmly did support 
what TNSM was demanding from the government of Pakistan. 
 
Q14. Do you prefer Sharia Law over the traditional Law?  
 
As expected, an overwhelming majority of the people 
surveyed preffered Sharia Law over traditional. The 
most common reason that was stated for this answer 
choice was that the traditional law was slow and 
complicated while Sharia Law was quick and 
straightforward. Also people believe that the Sharia 
Law system was affordable for everyone while the 
traditional law was heavily influenced by money and 
power of the litigants. Respondents also mentioned 
that traditionally Swat had a version of Sharia Law 
under the Wali Swat which was quick and well understood by nearly all people. The Traditional 
Law on the other hand was something most people still did not understand especially in the 
rural areas of Swat.  
 
 
Q15. Who do you think runs Swat? 
The main purpose of this question was to figure out 
the level of understanding common people had of the 
governance structure in Swat/Malakand. When asked 
who ran Swat i.e. was the person responsible for 
taking the important decisions, half the respondents 
replied by saying it was the Brigade Commander. 
About 30% of the interviewees thought it was the 
commissioner while about 20% thought it was the 
Political Agent. The correct answer is Commissioner of 
Swat is the final authority in the region as he takes the 
important decisions. But due to the heavy military presence in Swat, common people assume 
the Brigade Commander is the one in charge. This also proves the earlier question about how 
well people understood the political structure in Swat by reinforcing the notion that most 
people do not even understand the political structure.  
 
Q16. Did the government's strategy of appeasement 
make the TNSM stronger? 
 
90% of the respondents believed that the 
government’s strategy to continue negotiating with 
the TNSM after their proven track record of breaking 
peace accords only encouraged and emboldened the 
Final Thesis  Adnan Rasool  
19 
 
0 
10 
20 
Yes No 
Do you think the government 
should negotiate with Armed 
Groups? 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
Corruption Economy  Social Services 
What is biggest problem facing 
Swat post conflict? 
70% 
30% 
Has your opinion of the 
Government changed post 
conflict? 
Yes 
No 
TNSM. Respondents also blamed the strategy of appeasement for TNSM expanding its 
operations in Kohistan and Shangla, nearby areas which were not traditional TNSM strongholds. 
The respondents also pointed out that continuous negotiations with a group like TNSM also 
shows that the government was unwilling to commit to Swat and did not want to take the 
problem head on. Given this, the TNSM became more brazen in their attacks while gaining 
enough time to get extra fighters from Afghanistan.  
 
Q17. Do you think the government should negotiate 
with Armed Groups? 
Even after failed negotiations and peace treaties with 
the TNSM, majority of the people maintained that the 
government should negotiate with armed groups in 
the first instance. About 40% of the respondents 
thought that in the aftermath of the TNSM and the 
conflict the government should never negotiate with 
armed groups as it just emboldens them. 
 
 
Q18. What is biggest problem facing Swat post 
conflict? 
 
An overwhelming majority of the people surveyed 
thought the biggest problem facing Swat currently was 
corruption. Following that, Economy was the next 
major concern for a number of people. Respondents 
also mentioned that corruption at the government 
level was a major reason for slow recovery of Swat and 
that during the TNSM; corruption was at its bare 
minimum. The economic conditions although 
improving slowly have become worse due to the conflict as a number of crucial pieces of 
infrastructure were destroyed during the conflict and fixing them is taking a very long time. 
People also complained that the corruption was an over arching theme to all problems being 
faced in Swat ever since the conflict had ended.  
 
Q19. Has your opinion of the Government changed 
post conflict? 
When asked if their opinion of government had 
changed for the positive after the conflict, majority of 
the people responded positively. They praised the 
army and security forces for their part in the conflict. 
They attributed their change in opinion of the 
government to the aforementioned institutions, while 
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there is still a minority of people who have the same opinion of the government after the 
conflict. It should be noted that all people who have an unchanged opinion of the government 
belong to the rural areas.  
 
Q20. In your opinion what led to the Swat Conflict? 
One of the most important questions asked was what 
led to eth conflict in the first place. Nearly half the 
people surveyed thought weak government and 
institutions led to the conflict in Swat. They blamed 
weak government for allowing TNSM to stake a claim 
in the region. About 30% of the people thought it was 
talibanization that had led to TNSM waging a war on 
the state of Pakistan while a small minority thought 
that the conflict had other drivers. This answer 
supports the hypothesis, that weak institutions and government were the driving force behind 
the conflict.  
 
 
Q21. Why do you think the TNSM/ Taliban were 
successful in taking over Swat? 
 
The answer to this question was as expected mostly 
related to how governance was weak and put up no 
fight against the TNSM. Although there were 
respondents who believed strong local support and 
brute force employed by the TNSM were the major 
factors that led to swat being taken over. As this was 
an open ended question, these three reasons were the 
ones that were repeated most often. Based on all 
discussions held during the survey, TNSM were able to take over based on all these factors. It is 
debatable to what played a bigger part but the consensus is that they had local support that 
provided them information prior to their attacks which the weak district government was 
unable to repel. In addition to this, it was also pointed out that the local Levies force was nearly 
killed off by the TNSM in targeted killings. So when they entered the city, they hardly received 
any resistance from local law enforcement.  
 
Q22. What does governance mean to you? 
 
This question was aimed at gauging what the people understood as governance. The reason 
this question was asked was due to the earlier answers that quoted most people saying bad 
governance or weak government led to the conflict. This inferred that people had a good 
understand of what governance meant in the first place. But when asked this question, 
respondents answered with very varied responses. Most people believed governance meant 
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how quick things would be done by the government. Another popular response tied 
governance with the amount of direct help provided by the government to the local people. 
Few other responses included governance as ensuring public safety, governance as better 
judicial system and governance as government involvement in daily life of people. Based on 
these answers it can be observed that most of the people have a very vague idea of what 
governance means, they understand some of the various components that go in to governance 
but are unaware of other many other crucial issues.  
 
Q23. What do you think of the current governance in Swat? 
 
As a follow up to the earlier question, the respondents 
were asked what they thought of the current level of 
governance in Swat. Most people though it was either 
good or OK. When asked to explain why they thought 
so, most respondents pointed out how the government 
had conducted the operation there to clean out the 
area and helped people through various direct help 
schemes, it was also pointed out that government had 
improved its operations by improving its district 
offices. Most people pointed out that Army’s strong 
presence is one of the major reasons they think that the governance is improving in Swat. 
People who referred to army also tie governance with human security. 
 
Q24. Has the government done enough in the post conflict scenario? 
 
This question generated a lot of debate on what has happened since the conflict ended. A 
number of people argued that the government had done whatever it could, given the nature of 
the conflict and that total recovery would come over time. It was highlighted numerous times 
how the government’s social security program and district offices had made life easier for 
people. Direct help along with help from International and Local NGOs was also provided as 
evidence of government doing their level best in a tricky scenario.  
 
But on the other hand a large amount of respondents believed that the government has still 
not done enough since the conflict had ended. They believed that the government was 
genuinely interested in getting rid of the TNSM from this region but they were less interested in 
developing the region on a long term basis. The argument being made was that, the initial 
government interest was purely due to the security and strategic importance of Swat which had 
been addressed ever since the Army was stationed there. Once this concern had been 
addressed the government chose not to spend time and resources on this area and simply 
resorted to letting NGOs and other philanthropic organizations to lead the relief efforts. 
Respondents clearly stated that although the NGOs had done some good work, most of them 
were not interested in helping Swat develop over the long run and were simply there for the 
short haul, leaving the people of Swat on their own after just a couple of years.  
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Overall, the discussion led to the point that government had initially taken interest in the region 
and started multiple programs to help the local population, but since then the government 
interest in long term development of the region had waned. 
  
Q25. What are your expectations from the government? 
 
Aimed as being a follow up of the earlier question, the responses to this question were very 
similar to those given earlier. Most of the respondents highlighted the following wish list they 
wanted the government to provide them with. 
 
• Jobs/Micro-Finance/Financial Aid 
- Nearly all correspondents mentioned that they would like the government to 
provide them jobs. Given that since the conflict the local economy is in tatters 
with most people leaving Swat to find jobs elsewhere, those still living in Swat 
have no job opportunities. The respondents believed that government should 
start a hiring program so that at least one person from each family was 
employed by the government to ensure every family had an income. At this 
point, the respondents were told that what they are asking for might not be 
feasible for the government money wise. To this they asked that if the 
government cannot provide those jobs, they can at least provide them soft loans 
through micro-finance or even small one time grants so people can invest to 
create businesses in the region.  
• Food and Shelter 
- During a conflict a number of people lost their homes due to collateral damage. 
At least 5 of the respondents lost homes during the operation and since then 
had received little or no help from the government. In addition to that a number 
of respondents had lost their crops due to badly damaged agricultural land as a 
result of the conflict. The respondents believed that initially the government had 
helped out with food supplies for about 6 months as many IDPs were returning 
but since then the government has hardly helped out with regards to rebuilding 
of houses and rehabilitation of agricultural land. Most people who lost their 
crops did not receive any compensation from the government and as a result 
have gone under serious debt. Food and shelter is still an issue in the area and 
every single respondent expects the government to do something about it. 
When asked to elaborate what the respondents would like to see happen, they 
mentioned that government could help by providing seeds for free and also 
helping out with fertilizer and other agricultural equipment. Another action that 
was suggested was creation of food banks to help out those in urgent need as 
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well as government subsidies in the region on basic staples such as Rice and 
Wheat. 
• Education 
- Swat has only one Higher Education College that has been serving the needs of 
the whole region. The newly created University of Swat is still in the process of 
establishing itself as a major player in the Malakand region. Given this scenario 
most of the respondents want the government to create more higher education 
colleges across the whole region and not just in Mingora. Respondents also 
highlighted that even though Swat has over 200 primary and secondary schools, 
most of NGO and government focus was still on building primary schools. It was 
pointed out that although the intention of ensuring every child attends school 
was noble, the government and the NGOs needed to understand that after 
attending school these students have hardly any place to attend. So instead of 
investing resources in school level education, they needed to be spent on 
tertiary education. The respondents mentioned repeatedly the need for trade 
and technical colleges in the area that could train people in vocational skills that 
could help them get jobs across the Pakistan.  
 
In addition to the Survey that was conducted, Key Personnel interviews were held in Peshawar 
and Swat as well. These interviews were conducted with personnel from various Organizations 
and Institutions that play a major role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. While the 
survey presents the story from the point of view of the demand side and the end user, the key 
personnel interviews represent the story from the point of view of the supply side. In this 
regard all major institutions that are present in Swat were interviewed. These include: 
1. Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA), Peshawar 
a. Interviewee: Shakeel Iqbal and Mohammad Yasir 
2. Commissioner’s Office  
a. Interviewee: Naeem Akhtar, Assistant Commissioner Development 
3. Pakistan Army  
a. Interviewee: Brigadier Sajjad Chaudhry, Brigade Commander Swat-Malakand 
4. Local Media 
a. Interviewee: Rasheed Iqbal, Editor Daily ‘Chaand’ and Former Nazim  
5. Civil Society 
a. Interviewee: Farook Swati, Aid Coordinator Swat  
The interviews are tabulated in the Institutional Response Matrix (IRM) for comparison 
purposes.  
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Institutional Response Matrix 
Questions 
 
Respondents 
 
PaRRSA Commissioner's 
Office 
Army Local Media Civil Society 
How did your 
organization 
respond to the 
conflict?  
The organization 
was formed in order 
to address the 
situation that was 
created after the 
conflict had ended. 
The organization is 
directly responsible 
for all aid and 
development work 
being conducted in 
the region since the 
conflict.    
The commissioner’s 
office acted first 
during the start of 
the conflict by 
managing the 
evacuation of 
civilians from Swat. 
The Commissioner’s 
office was 
dismantled under 
the TNSM rule and 
since the conflict has 
ended, the office is 
responsible for 
ensuring 
government 
presence and 
control in the region 
while also 
coordinating aid 
efforts through 
PaRRSA.  
Pakistan Army 
conducted the 
operation against 
the militant 
organization TNSM 
and its allies. The 
operation that 
began in late 2009 
was completed 
within 45 day and 
militants were 
flushed out of the 
region. The Army 
ensured that 
collateral damage 
was kept to a 
minimum during this 
process. Since the 
end of the conflict, 
Army is posted in 
Swat to ensure long 
term peace in the 
region.    
The local media was 
the first outlet to 
point towards the 
growing violence in 
the area mainly 
being carried out by 
the TNSM. Since the 
conflict started the 
media was reporting 
details which were 
initially ignored by 
the mainstream 
media. Once the 
TNSM had taken 
over Mingora, the 
national media 
started paying any 
attention. Since the 
end of the conflict, 
local media has been 
actively involved in 
reporting on local 
issues.    
Before the conflict 
Swat had hardly any 
presence of the Civil 
Society. Since then 
the civil society in 
partnership with 
PaRRSA has been 
conducting various 
aid projects in the 
region. WFP along 
with PaRRSA 
distributed free food 
rations to returning 
IDPs. Other NGOs 
are actively taking 
part in leading the 
rehabilitation and 
reconstruction 
efforts.   
Could the 
conflict have 
been avoided? 
 The power the 
TNSM had gathered 
made sure that the 
 The conflict could 
have been easily 
avoided if only the 
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conflict was bound 
to happen.  
government had not 
appeased the TNSM 
for years, 
emboldening them 
in the process. Every 
time negotiated with 
them, it provided 
them time to 
consolidate their 
advances.  
Do you think 
the Conflict was 
handled 
properly? 
Yes, the conflict was 
handled in the best 
possible manner. 
Nothing else could 
have been done in 
such a situation and 
the army operation 
was organized and 
well executed.  
Yes. Nothing more 
could have been 
done.   
The Army did its 
best to keep the 
collateral damage to 
the minimum. The 
minimal loss of life is 
proof of how 
surgical the 
operation was.  
No, the conflict 
could have been 
handled better if the 
District Government 
and the Political 
Agent had acted 
early. The provincial 
government’s 
delayed response 
because the conflict 
to become much 
bigger than it 
actually was. The 
following Army 
Operation was well 
executed though. 
 
Are you 
satisfied with 
your 
department’s 
performance in 
Yes, the department 
has been 
responsible for all 
aid efforts in the 
region and has done 
Yes, since the 
conflict ended, the 
District 
Commissioner’s 
office has acted a 
Yes. The army has 
ensured peace in the 
region since the end 
of the conflict while 
also taking an active 
Yes, the media has 
done its utmost to 
report on relief 
efforts and tell 
people how they can 
NGOs working with 
PaRRSA have taken 
various steps to lead 
the relief efforts in 
the region. In the 
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the Post 
Conflict 
Scenario? 
an excellent job 
ensuring aid money 
was delivered and 
relief work was 
started on time.  
focal point for all 
development and 
relief efforts in the 
area. The relief 
efforts have been 
conduct in a 
professional manner 
and with proper 
accountability.  
part in relief efforts 
and reconstruction 
works in the region 
receive help.  last 2 years, NGOs 
working in the 
region have helped a 
large number of 
people getting back 
to normality. 
In your opinion 
has the level of 
governance 
improved as a 
result of the 
conflict? 
Yes. Since the end of 
the conflict, 
accountability has 
been of great 
concern in the 
region. That has 
directly had an 
impact on the level 
of governance which 
is much better than 
the rest of the 
province.   
The level of 
governance in Swat 
has improved as 
there are more 
resources available 
now and the Federal 
Government is 
actively keeping an 
eye on the situation.  
 Initially the level of 
governance 
improved as the 
eyes of the country 
were focused on the 
region. There was 
severe 
accountability but 
within the last 2 
years, things are 
slowly getting back 
to the way they 
were before the 
conflict. The 
provincial 
government is losing 
interest in the region 
as it is no longer a 
security concern.   
Yes, things are 
smoother now with 
regards to getting 
access to 
government 
services. People 
have better access 
to justice now which 
was a key reason for 
the conflict in the 
first place.  
Will simplifying 
Swat’s political 
status help with 
Swat’s status would 
have no impact on 
its future stability 
It would make a 
difference if Swat 
were directly under 
 It would make a 
large difference as 
currently Swat is 
No it would make no 
difference as the 
Provincial 
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its future 
growth and 
stability?  
and growth.  the provincial 
government instead 
of being under a 
division. This would 
help with improved 
funding decisions 
and resource 
mobilization.   
under the Malakand 
Division. But if Swat 
were directly under 
provincial 
government, it 
would bring in more 
resources for the 
area and better 
development 
prospects 
Government 
coordinates most of 
the things directly.   
In hindsight, 
should the 
government 
have used the 
appeasement 
strategy with 
the TNSM?  
Yes. Regardless of 
what happened, the 
government always 
aims to defuse 
tensions in any area 
through negotiations 
before starting an 
operation that can 
result in a loss of 
life.   
Yes. Negotiations 
are always the first 
choice. Once that 
option is exhausted, 
armed intervention 
is taken up.  
  No, the government 
helped TNSM do 
more damage by 
negotiating with 
them. With each 
negotiation, the 
TNSM gained more 
power and garnered 
a larger support 
base as they directly 
started controlling 
various resources.   
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Data Analysis 
 
The field study along with key personnel interviews presents an interesting mix of data. In most 
instances the data supports the hypothesis of this paper that the Swat conflict was a result of:  
• Power Vacuum as a direct result of the Political Status Ambiguity  
• Lack of Development 
• Appeasement Strategy 
Based on the questions asked to respondents, there is clear trend that blames these three 
factors as being the primary reason TNSM was originally formed and then later thrived in to an 
organization capable of taking over the whole region. The critical response that supports this 
notion categorically was to the question ‘In your opinion were the demands of TNSM valid?’ to 
which 67% of the respondents said ‘Yes’. This highlights the predicament of the local population 
who prefer the Sharia law as a matter of choice over the traditional law. This also proves why 
initially the TNSM were supported in the region. The data also highlights that even now, 2 years 
after the conflict, the local population’s opinion of the government and TNSM is the same. 
While in TNSM days the population took issue with their brute force and militancy, these days it 
is the corruption that the people dislike. 
 
The data also suggests that while the idea of appeasing the TNSM with multiple peace 
agreements was generally not like by the local population, the people still believe that 
negotiations should be held before any operation takes place. This shows an inherent divide 
that Swat as a region faces. They want to have peace and security but they are not willing to go 
to all out war against a faction.  
 
Another interesting contradiction that was raised by the data collected is to do with 
governance. While nearly all respondents deem governance to be important to them, they have 
no clear definition of what it really is. Answer to the question ‘What does governance mean to 
you?’ was varied with most people tying good governance to mean how quick things got done 
while others including the justice system and law & order to be components of governance. 
Data reveals that although the respondents did not know exact terms such as ‘governance’, 
‘Appeasement’ or ‘Political Status’, they all used various components and actions that are 
synonymous with the terms. An example of this was when asked ‘In your opinion what led to 
the Swat Conflict?’ most people replied by saying it was due to weak government i.e. the local 
government and levies force were unable to exert their control throughout the area while 
maintain minimal presence in Mingora and Saidu Sharif. This led to TNSM creating bases 
around the region without much resistance. Technically this instance is a form of bad 
governance where the local and the provincial government are completely out of touch with 
the happenings outside major cities.   
 
Data also shows the link lack of development had with this conflict. Questions relating to the 
time of Wali Swat and government performance clearly highlight the drastic drop in satisfaction 
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levels. The drop as evidenced by the data was mainly due to the complicated Justice System 
and the low levels of development since then. Respondents categorically mentioned how roads 
and bridges were built and maintained on regular basis during the time of Wali Swat but since 
then getting even small road built had become multiyear task. An example that was highlighted 
during data collection was the availability of only 1 major Hospital in Saidu Sharif. The DHQ 
hospital received patients from all across the region and is severely short staffed. The 
respondents pointed out that in the years after annexation; Swat has had little or no 
investment in the sectors like Health Care, Technical Training and Agriculture Development. 
This lack of development has led to high unemployment in the region. While major cities are 
coping with it, the problem affects the rural areas more severely especially after the earth 
quake and floods hit the region. This situation was ripe for an organization like TNSM to take 
control of areas by providing help and assistance albeit at very low levels.   
 
In addition to the survey results presenting an interesting picture that supports the hypothesis 
of this paper, the key personnel interviews tend to do the same. Based on the Institutional 
Response Matrix, it can be observed that the local government concedes that changing Swat’s 
status would make a large difference as it would translate in to more funds and direct access to 
the provincial government. It was also established that the current ambiguity of Swat’s status is 
the driving force behind slowing down any projects that need an approval. This according to the 
interviewees was a main reason for the lack of development in the region as it takes a 
considerable amount of time before a project can be undertaken. This issue compounded over 
several years resulted in low levels of development in the region that hurt the local economy.  
 
Key Personnel Interviews also consolidated the notion that appeasement was a government 
priority as it did not want bloodshed but the relevant institutions conceded that eventually this 
strategy had caused more damage. The local media was firmly against such an approach as it 
feared the worse. But even after the failed appeasement of militants in Swat, all state 
institutions continue to believe it to be the natural first response as they would much rather 
have negotiations and concede control than have a full on conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final Thesis  Adnan Rasool  
30 
 
Conclusion 
 
The core question that this paper set out to examine was a straightforward one i.e. what 
factor/s led to historically peaceful Swat/Malakand to enter an armed conflict in the first 
place and what it would take to ensure a lasting peace in the region post conflict. While there 
is a large body of literature that answers this question by presenting the view that the growing 
trend of Talibanization combined with religious extremism and overflow of the Afghan War20 
was to blame for the Swat Conflict and that the weak early response by the Provincial 
Government helped prolong the conflict. This paper has attempted to present the alternative 
narrative that blames Political Status Ambiguity of Swat, Lack of Development and Strategy of 
Appeasement to be the reason why there was a conflict in the first place.  
This paper through the help of a field survey and key personnel interviews has presented 
evidence that backs this hypothesis. Various questions and discussions that started out on how 
the conflict normally boiled down to what started it and what factors affected it. In order to 
make the case for this hypothesis, the historical background was presented as well to signify 
the change in situation since the annexation of the region. The data being presented in this 
paper comprehensively backs the hypothesis that it was the above mentioned three factors 
that led to the conflict. The data that has been presented in this paper also helps in chalking out 
the future sustainability of the volatile peace in the region.  
It is apparent that bad governance played a large role not only in the conflict but in the very 
creation of the TNSM. Coupled with flawed public policy at the local level, governance issues 
only helped make matters worse. Even technical and bureaucratic decisions like the political 
and administrative status of Swat had a direct impact on creation of this conflict. The point that 
comes across this research paper is that while conflict might be managed in various ways using 
different strategies21. The reasons that lead to a conflict such as this are often ignored once the 
conflict ends and often end up bringing a conflict like situation back to the region. So while it is 
a straightforward notion that no long term peace can be gained without rooting out the core 
issues, in a case like Swat, that notion seems to be lost. This is evidenced by the responses in 
the survey that point towards the possibility of TNSM returning to the region once the Army 
leaves or at least lowers its numbers. This answer quite simply infers that while the peace has 
been achieved temporarily, the conflict is bound to come back as the issues that caused this are 
still persisting. And this goes back to the starting argument that prolonged bad governance led 
to this conflict and based on the data that seems to be continuing even now.  
                                                          
20 White, Joshua T.  (2008). The Shape of Frontier Rule: Governance and Transition, from the Raj to the Modern 
Pakistani Frontier. Asian Security Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3. 
21 White, Joshua T. (2009). Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan’s Frontier. Brookings 
Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, No. 2.  
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The case of Swat also gives weight to the notion that while military operation can create short 
term temporary peace in a region, only good governance backed by robust public policy can 
ensure a long term resolution. In this specific case straight forward steps such as simplifying the 
political and administrative status of Swat can have a major impact on the daily lives of its 
inhabitants. This small step translates in to better development for the region in the long run as 
it receives more funds as a district under the provincial set up rather than under the 
Division/Agency set up. While state institutions believe their actions are correct and for the 
best of the local population, the case of Swat also signifies the divide between the opinion of 
the public and the state. This is evidenced through the data presented earlier where by the 
State Institutions believe that their performance is satisfactory since the conflict while the 
survey respondents have the same opinion of the State as they do of the TNSM. This effectively 
means that the people equate the State with TNSM perception wise. Any state that is being 
equated to militant’s perception wise is at loss of understanding their target audience i.e. their 
people. Hence this leads to the very real prospect of misunderstanding of public demands while 
policy formulation that eventually hurts the governance in the region. The lesson here is that it 
is a vicious cycle of policy and governance where public disconnect at formulation stage 
equates to public disgruntlement at the governance level. 
The discussion throughout the paper focuses on the different elements that make up good 
governance. In a post conflict situation, the flaws pointed out in this and many other research 
papers on this issue will define how long the peace lasts i.e. without a concentrated policy 
process aimed at addressing the core issues, there is going to be no long term stability of the 
region. Hence the derived conclusion that conflicts may be ended with force but sustainable 
peace would require policy decisions. And often the policy decisions required to keep the peace 
would be similar to the ones that were missing at the time the conflict started.   
